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AS A NEGATIVE RIGHT, ARTICLE 25 CAN HAVE A 
POSITIVE EFFECT COMBATING JAPAN’S POVERTY 
Amelia S. Kegan† 
Abstract: Article 25 of the Showa Constitution guarantees everyone in Japan a 
minimum standard of “wholesome and cultured living.”  Contrary to the force originally 
envisioned by the Constitution’s framers, the Supreme Court of Japan has interpreted the 
provision as merely a programmatic declaration that guides the legislature rather than as 
an enforceable right under which an individual may sue.  As a result, individuals cannot 
seek relief from the judiciary for Article 25 violations.  The Supreme Court should 
recognize Article 25 also as a negative, concrete right, allowing individuals to seek 
judicial relief when the government fails to appropriately apply laws intended to promote 
the public’s ability to maintain a “minimum standard of living.” 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An impoverished man is sick, unable to work, and in desperate need 
of a doctor.  Although a Japanese law mandates that everyone carry health 
insurance, the man cannot afford the government premiums, and the public 
official who operates the insurance program refuses to reduce or exempt the 
premium levels for anyone in a constant state of poverty.  The man’s 
indigence and the official’s actions prevent the man from complying with the 
law; he looks to the Constitution for help.  A provision guarantees everyone 
the right to a minimum standard of living, yet the judiciary denies such 
claims even when the State actively prevents individuals from obtaining that 
constitutionally guaranteed right.   
Article 25 of the Showa Constitution, Japan’s constitution since 1946, 
states, “(1) All people shall have the right to maintain the minimum 
standards of wholesome and cultured living [“Minimum Standards Clause”].  
(2) In all spheres of life, the State shall use its endeavors for the promotion 
and extension of social welfare and security, and of public health 
[“Promotions Clause”].”1  Despite this constitutional protection, the State 
prevents people from maintaining a minimum standard of living, and 
individuals are left without recourse.  
                                           
†
 The author would like to thank Ron Hjorth for his advice and guidance, Rob Britt for his 
assistance locating Japanese materials, and Dan Foote for his early review and suggestions for further 
research.  The author especially would like to thank Bradley Bashaw, Luke Campbell, Ray Liaw, and in 
particular Karen Clevering for the countless hours they spent editing drafts and their strong support 
throughout the writing process.  Any errors or omissions are the author’s own. 
1
  KENPŌ, art. 25, available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s3 (alterations 
added). 
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Constitutional scholars have found it useful to divide rights into 
negative rights and positive rights.2  Negative rights usually prohibit the 
government from interfering with a freedom3 and are more common in 
liberal, pre-World War II constitutions.4  Negative rights are almost always 
concrete because if the State violates the right, the courts will grant 
individual relief.5  Positive rights, on the other hand, require the government 
to provide certain things and are common among post-World War II 
constitutions.6  Often referred to as “aspirational rights,” positive rights 
usually convey affirmative benefits and protections.7   
Courts can interpret rights as either concrete rights or programmatic 
declarations.  A concrete right enables a citizen to sue if the State denies him 
or her that right.8  However, a programmatic declaration only guides the 
legislature, directing it to pass legislation that promotes the right.9  
Programmatic declarations provide no mechanism for citizens to seek 
judicial relief if the government fails to provide or enforce the right. 
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court of Japan should 
recognize and apply the concrete, negative right10 within Article 25 in its 
ruling, enabling the individual to bring a claim against the government.  
Article 25 is currently understood to be a programmatic declaration, which 
merely directs the legislature to pass certain programs (such as social 
welfare programs), and a concrete right that provides a justiciably 
enforceable claim.  As a concrete, negative right, Article 25 allows an 
individual to bring a claim against the State for infringing upon a right.  A 
positive right mandates the government act (i.e. provide certain benefits) 
whereas a negative right prohibits the government from acting in a certain 
way.11  The State can violate Article 25’s concrete, negative right in three 
ways:  1) the Diet could pass a law that prevents individuals from 
                                           
2
  Some also refer to first-generation and second-generation rights in expressing the same distinction.  
Tamar Ezer, A Positive Right to Protection for Children, 7 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 6 (2004). 
3
  Eric C. Christiansen, Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-Economic Rights and the South 
African Constitutional Court, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 321, 345 (2007). 
4
  See Ellen Wiles, Aspirational Principles or Enforceable Rights? The Future for Socio-Economic 
Rights in National Law, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 35, 45 (2006).  The Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides an example of a negative right.  See infra notes 22-35 and accompanying text. 
5
  Akira Osuka, Welfare Rights, 53 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 17 (1990). 
6
  See Patricia M. Wald, Some Unsolicited Advice to My Women Friends in Eastern Europe, 46 
SMU L. REV. 557, 559 (1992) (using the term "aspirational rights" in the place of "positive rights"). 
7
  See id. at 558-59. 
8
  See Osuka, supra note 5, at 17. 
9
  See id. at 18. 
10
  While the terms “first-generation rights” and “second-generation rights” also can apply, this 
Comment uses the terms “positive rights” and “negative rights” as a matter of stylistic preference and not to 
indicate any substantive difference in meaning.  
11
  See Wald, supra note 6, at 559; Christiansen, supra note 3, at 345. 
JUNE 2008 JAPAN’S ARTICLE 25 AS A NEGATIVE RIGHT 737 
  
maintaining a minimum standard of living, 2) the executive could prevent 
individuals from maintaining a minimum standard of living (independent of 
any statute), and 3) the executive could enforce a law so that it infringes 
upon one’s ability to maintain a minimum standard of living. 
Part II of this Comment demonstrates that although the constitutional 
framers drafted Article 25 as an enforceable right, the Supreme Court of 
Japan has interpreted it as only a programmatic declaration.  Part III argues 
that Article 25 provides both a positive and a negative right, but the negative 
right makes the provision enforceable, enabling an individual to bring a 
claim.  Part IV explains how the Court has failed to engage in any negative-
rights analysis in its Article 25 opinions.  Part V shows how the Court’s 
misinterpretation of Article 25 conflicts with Japan’s obligations under 
international law.  Part VI argues the Court should interpret Article 25 as a 
concrete, negative right to provide the public stronger protection of the right. 
This Comment makes three assumptions.  First, a definition of what 
constitutes a “minimum standard of living” may help the Court’s Article 25 
enforcement, but deriving one is beyond the scope of this Comment.  This 
Comment assumes the judiciary can use a reasonableness standard to 
determine whether the State infringed upon an individual’s Article 25 rights.  
The Japanese judiciary should balance the harm the government imposes on 
the individual against the public welfare it promotes.  The courts should 
employ that standard, provided they do not abuse it to avoid enforcing the 
provision. 
As a second assumption, this Comment recognizes that the Diet could 
provide more detailed language directing the executive on how to enforce 
statutes.  While this could prevent the executive from improperly applying 
laws so as to violate Article 25, this legislative direction counters the wide 
discretion the Diet habitually gives the executive.12   
Finally, this Comment treats Article 25 and other social rights as 
human rights.  International human rights treaties protect many of the same 
rights enumerated in constitutions.13  The terms “human rights” and 
“constitutional rights” are often used interchangeably within this Comment.  
                                           
12
  See Christopher A. Ford, The Indigenization of Constitutionalism in the Japanese Experience, 28 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 3, 55 (1996). 
13
  See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Theories of Justice, Human Rights, and the Constitution of 
International Markets, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 407, 407 n.2 (2003). 
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II. ARTICLE 25 GRANTS AN INDIVIDUALLY ENFORCEABLE NEGATIVE RIGHT 
ALONG WITH STATING A PROGRAMMATIC POSITIVE RIGHT 
Article 25 provides a negative right in addition to a positive right, and 
therefore should allow individuals to obtain judicial relief.  Article 25, like 
many human rights, grants both a positive right (“the State shall use its 
endeavors for the promotion and extension of social welfare”14) and a 
negative right (“[a]ll people shall have the right to maintain the minimum 
standards of wholesome and cultured living”15), prohibiting the government 
from preventing one from maintaining a minimum standard of living.  
Positive rights are harder to enforce, and courts throughout the world are 
hesitant to interpret positive rights as concrete rights,16 which explains why 
so many positive rights become merely programmatic declarations.  In 
contrast, a negative right is naturally concrete and therefore has more force 
than a positive right, which is not naturally concrete.17  The existence of both 
negative and positive rights in Article 25 is supported by objective criteria 
that define such rights and by examining the Article’s text. 
A. Under Objective Criteria, Article 25 Provides a Negative Right in 
Addition to a Positive Right   
Article 25 has three essential components of a negative right:  1) the 
right focuses on the individual,18 2) the right prohibits state action,19 and 3) 
injunctive relief for a violation of the right requires a preventative writ.20  
Negative and positive rights delineate easily as concepts, but in reality, most 
rights encompass aspects of both.  When interpreting rights, one can expect 
a government to take, at a minimum, the easiest route to enforcement.  It 
requires less effort for a state to enforce a negative right than a positive 
right;21 therefore, when faced with a right both positive and negative, the 
courts would at least enforce the negative right.  The above criteria define 
                                           
14
  KENPŌ, art. 25(2). 
15
  Id. art. 25(1). 
16
  See Christiansen, supra note 3, at 345. 
17
  See Osuka, supra note 5, at 17. 
18
  Charles H. Brower II, NAFTA's Investment Chapter: Initial Thoughts About Second-Generation 
Rights, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1533, 1538 (2003) (referencing the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights as a document possessing negative rights).  
19
  See Ezer, supra note 2, at 4. 
20
  Requiring a preventative writ is not a formal criterion for a negative right.  However, it logically 
follows that a preventative writ to stop a prohibited state action would provide redress. 
21
  See Wald, supra note 6, at 559 (positing the view that positive rights cannot be judicially 
enforceable); Wiles, supra note 4, at 50 (restating arguments about the difficulty in legally enforcing socio-
economic rights). 
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Article 25 as both a positive and a negative right; thus, the courts should 
prefer interpreting Article 25 as a negative right because of the relative ease 
in enforcement. 
The first element in establishing that a negative right exists requires 
an examination of whether the right’s language focuses on the individual or 
the State.  Language in a positive right directs the State; language of a 
negative right focuses on the individual.22  The Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution exemplifies the individual focus of negative 
rights.  The right holds that “No person shall be held to answer for 
any . . . crime . . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offence.”23  
The language aims at the individual’s freedom.  Article IX of the 
Washington State Constitution provides an example of a positive right:  “It is 
the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of 
all children residing within its borders.”24  Unlike the Fifth Amendment, 
Article IX focuses on the State and its duty. 
When applied to Article 25, the objective criteria show that the 
Promotions Clause25 provides a positive right while the Minimum Standards 
Clause26 provides both a positive and negative right.  Under the first criteria, 
Section 1 focuses on the individual: “All people shall have the right.”27  
However, Section 2 focuses on the State: “the State shall use its 
endeavors.”28  On whole, therefore, Article 25 provides a negative right and 
a positive right. 
The second criterion examines whether the right requires state action 
or prohibits it.  A positive right requires the State to take affirmative action, 
often demanding state resources29 and intervening in private affairs.30  A 
negative right restricts certain governmental action upon an individual.  
Applying the above examples, the Fifth Amendment lists a number of 
individual liberties of which the State cannot interfere.31  If the government 
                                           
22
  See Ezer, supra note 2, at 4. 
23
  U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).  
24
  WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1, available at http://www.leg.wa.gov/LawsAndAgencyRules/ 
constitution.htm (emphasis added). 
25
  KENPŌ, art. 25(2) (“In all spheres of life, the State shall use its endeavors for the promotion and 
extension of social welfare and security, and of public health.”). 
26
  Id. art. 25(1) (“All people shall have the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome 
and cultured living.”). 
27
  Id. (emphasis added). 
28
  Id. art. 25(2) (emphasis added). 
29
  See Ezer, supra note 2, at 4; Wiles, supra note 4, at 45. 
30
  See Brower, supra note 18, at 1545. 
31
  See U.S. CONST. amend. V (granting the right not to be held for a crime without a grand jury 
indictment, the right against double jeopardy, the right against self-incrimination, the right to due process 
of law, and the right not to have private property taken for public use without just compensation). 
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does not do anything to infringe upon the rights, no violation occurs.  
Contrarily, if Washington State does not act to “make ample provision for 
the education of all children,”32 then the government violates the right. 
This second criterion paints Article 25 as a negative and positive right.  
The Minimum Standards Clause mandates the State “use its endeavors for 
the promotion and extension of social welfare and security, and of public 
health.”33  The text of the Promotion’s Clause does not clearly point to 
government restraint or government action.  Intuitively, Section 1 could 
require the State to provide a minimum standard of living.  Yet, Section 1 
implicitly prohibits the government from interfering upon one’s attempts to 
maintain a minimum standard of living.  If everyone has “the right to 
maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living,”34 then a 
state action that prevents someone from maintaining a minimum standard of 
living would violate that right.  Little sense lies in providing a right but 
allowing the government to deny its existence by abusively violating it.  Just 
as the Fifth Amendment right against forcibly being a witness against 
oneself35 restricts the State from interfering with that right, the right to a 
minimum standard of living prevents the State from interfering with that 
right as well.  Section 1’s textual phrasing may not give a clear answer as to 
what action it requires from the State, but it appears to hold aspects of both a 
negative and a positive right. 
The final criterion examines whether injunctive relief for a violation 
of the right would require state action or prohibit it.  Injunctive relief for a 
positive right requires the State to provide something, and the court issues an 
affirmative writ.  Conversely, injunctive relief for a negative right requires 
the State to stop acting, and the court issues a preventative writ.36  
The type of injunctive relief required for effective enforcement 
defines Article 25 as a positive and a negative right.  An affirmative writ for 
Article 25 requires legislation or executive action providing benefits that 
enable a person to maintain a minimum standard of living, essentially 
actively decreasing poverty rates.  At the same time, one also can imagine a 
situation wherein the State’s actions violate an Article 25 right.  For 
example, in Asahi v. Japan, the minister, after stopping all governmental 
payment assistance to Asahi, took an additional 900 yen from Asahi.37  In the 
                                           
32
  WASH. CONST. art. IX. 
33
  KENPŌ, art. 25. 
34
  Id. 
35
  See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
36
  See Christiansen, supra note 3, at 345. 
37
  Asahi v. Japan, 21 MINSHŪ 5, 1043 (Sup. Ct., May 24, 1967), translated in HIROSHI ITOH & 
LAWRENCE WARD BEER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN 133 (1978) [hereinafter Asahi]. 
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Staple Food Act Case,38 the government prosecuted the defendant for 
obtaining food above the ration limit.  In the Health Insurance Case,39 the 
mayor required payment of health insurance premiums the appellant could 
not afford, while refusing to apply any exemption or reduction because the 
appellant lived in a constant state of poverty rather than temporary 
hardship.40  In all these cases, a preventative writ could redress the 
violations, assuming the Court engaged in the reasonableness standard test.41  
Furthermore, the government would find these preventative writs easier to 
enforce than the affirmative writs.42 
B. A Textual Reading of Article 25 Supports Its Classification as Both a 
Positive and a Negative Right  
A plain text reading of Article 25 also establishes that it supplies both 
a positive and a negative right.  Section 2 indicates a positive, albeit 
unenforceable, right because it instructs the legislature and executive to 
promote social welfare.43  Article 25(2) directs the Diet to enact legislation 
promoting the public’s ability to maintain a minimum standard of living.44  
Two qualities of Article 25’s text support it as containing a negative 
right:  1) the principle that disapproves of reading text so as to make a 
provision superfluous, and 2) the definition of “maintain.”  First, an accepted 
American cannon of construction directs interpretation of legal text so as not 
to render a portion superfluous.45  Therefore, if Article 25 provides only an 
unenforceable programmatic declaration as the Supreme Court contends, 
then Section 1 only adds redundancy to the provision.  However, if Section 1 
articulates a negative right, prohibiting the State from interfering with one’s 
minimum standard of living, then Section 1 adds meaning not articulated in 
Section 2. 
Second, the definition of “maintain” characterizes Article 25 as a 
negative right.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “maintain” as meaning “to 
                                           
38
  See 2 (No. 6) MINSHŪ 1235 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 29, 1948), translated in JOHN M. MAKI, COURT AND 
CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN 254-55 (1964) [hereinafter Staple Food Act Case]. 
39
  Case no. 2000 Gyo-Tsu 62, 60 MINSHŪ 2, translated in  http://www.courts.go.jp/english/ 
judgments/text/2006.03.01-2000.-Gyo-Tsu-.No..62.html [hereinafter Health Insurance Case]. 
40
  Id. at Reasons III. 
41
  See infra Part V.B. (establishing that a negative-rights interpretation of Article 25 is practical, 
promoting courts to issue preventative writs). 
42
  See infra Part V.B. 
43
  See KENPŌ, art. 25(2) (“the State shall use its endeavors for the promotion and extension of social 
welfare and security, and of public health”). 
44
  Id. 
45
  See 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 61 (2008).  While this follows American constitutional 
law, the logical argument applies to the Japanese Constitution. 
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continue (something).”46  The definition gives the impression of inertia, that 
a person already has or already is working to achieve a minimum standard of 
living.  A violation of the Article is one that changes the status quo; it stops 
the existing situation, preventing it from continuing.  That violation 
manifests itself as government action that prevents one from continuing to 
have or continuing to work towards achieving a minimum standard of living.  
Thus, Article 25, Section 1 provides a negative right.  
C. Positive and Negative Rights May Coexist; They Are Not Mutually 
Exclusive 
The international legal community would easily accept the position 
that Article 25(1) provides both a positive and negative right.47  Even though 
the Minimum Standards Clause communicates a positive right on the 
surface, it also contains a concrete, negative right, enabling individuals to 
obtain relief from the courts.  International human rights legal theory has 
begun to reject the binary distinction between negative and positive rights,48 
supporting the argument that Article 25 provides both a negative and a 
positive right.  Legal theorists have fused the negative and positive rights 
categories together, viewing rights as simultaneously encompassing both as 
different sides of the same coin.49   
Judicially enforcing positive rights proves more difficult than negative 
rights.50  Courts may rule a positive right not concrete, but they will find a 
coexisting negative right as concrete and identify the judiciary as the proper 
institution to provide individual relief.  Therefore, the Court ruling Article 25 
as a positive right would not foreclose interpreting Article 25 as a concrete, 
negative right. 
As the South African Constitutional Court has recognized:  “The 
obligations created by the socioeconomic rights in the South African 
Constitution take two basic forms.  They impose a negative duty not to 
interfere with, or create barriers to the fulfillment of the rights in question, 
                                           
46
  BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 973 (8th ed. 2004). 
47
  See Osuka, supra note 5, at 17. 
48
  Ida Elisabeth Koch, Dichotomies, Trichotomies or Waves of Duties?, 5 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 81, 85 
(2005). 
49
  See Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, International Law, Human Rights, and Latcrit Theory: 
Civil and Political Rights—an Introduction, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM L. REV. 223, 236-37 (1997) (indicating 
the conception of negative rights as only civil and political rights is misleading because such rights also can 
be categorized as positive rights, requiring affirmative state action). 
50
  See Osuka, supra note 5, at 17 (discussing how “as to the guarantee of a negative right under the 
Constitution, all the theories recognize the legal nature of the right to a decent life as giving rise to 
judicially enforceable concrete rights,” while “the guarantee of any positive right” is not so universally 
held); Wiles, supra note 4, at 50 (discussing why positive rights are seen as unenforceable). 
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and a positive duty to promote and fulfill those rights.”51  No clear 
separation exists between negative and positive rights; instead, most rights 
incorporate aspects of both.  The South African Constitutional Court has 
asserted that, “At the very minimum, socio-economic rights can be 
negatively protected from improper invasion.”52  While social rights may fail 
justiciability as positive rights, they are enforceable as negative rights.53 
III. THE FRAMERS DRAFTED ARTICLE 25 AS AN ENFORCEABLE RIGHT BUT 
THE COURT MISINTERPRETS IT AS A PROGRAMMATIC DECLARATION 
Those framing the Showa Constitution in 1946 intended Article 25 to 
provide an enforceable, positive right.  However, members of the former, 
ultra-conservative, Japanese government formed the judiciary.54  Within two 
years, the Supreme Court interpreted Article 25 as merely a programmatic 
declaration,55 a position reaffirmed as recently as 2006.56  Furthermore, 
when the Court addresses Article 25 claims, it fails to engage in any 
negative-rights analysis. 
A. The Drafters Intended Article 25 to Provide an Enforceable Right 
Members of the Governmental Section (“GS”) of the Supreme 
Commander Allied Powers (“SCAP”)57 drafted Article 25 as a forceful, 
positive right.  Following World War II, the GS drafted Japan’s Showa 
Constitution.58  They modeled it after Germany’s Weimar Constitution,59 
demonstrating the intended force behind the social rights provisions.  The 
                                           
51
  Joan Fitzpatrick and Ron C. Slye, Economic and Social Rights-South Africa-Role of International 
Standards in Interpreting and Implementing Constitutionally Guaranteed Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 669, 
676 (2003). 
52
  Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at 78 (S. Afr.), available at 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/cgisirsi/20080217183929/SIRSI/0/520/J-CCT23-96. 
53
  See supra notes 5, 17 and accompanying text (stating that negative rights are enforceable). 
54
  See Sylvia Brown Hamano, Incomplete Revolutions and Not So Alien Transplants: The Japanese 
Constitution and Human Rights, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 415, 443 (1998) (stating the “judiciary was never 
purged to remove from positions of authority individuals with . . . obvious opposition to the new 
Constitution”). 
55
  See Staple Food Act Case, supra note 38, at 254-55; Osuka, supra note 5, at 17 (explaining how 
the Supreme Court found in the Staple Food Act Case that Article 25 was purely a “programmatic 
declaration”). 
56
  See generally Health Insurance Case, supra note 39. 
57
  General McArthur led the Supreme Commander Allied Powers [“SCAP”], the American force 
overseeing the occupation. See RAY A. MOORE & DONALD L. ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY 4-6 
(2002). 
58
  BEATE SIROTA GORDON, THE ONLY WOMAN IN THE ROOM 104 (1977). 
59
  See Osuka, supra note 5, at 16 (stating that social rights were modeled on the Weimar Constitution 
and incorporated American New Deal characteristics). 
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drafters wrote the document to require the government to provide for the 
people.  However, those involved in the enacting process did not have 
uniform expectations for the new constitution,60 and the Japanese 
government pushed back vigorously, which ultimately led to vaguer 
language than the drafters desired.61 
The Weimar Constitution and New Deal philosophy heavily 
influenced the drafters of Japan’s Showa Constitution, explaining the social 
rights’ weight and force.  The steering committee leading the GS contained 
few people familiar with Japan.62  While most were American lawyers, 
military officials, and political scientists, all were New Dealers who 
incorporated their perspectives in forming Japan’s new Constitution.63  A 
shared sense of responsibility existed among many drafting the Showa 
Constitution’s provisions “to effect a social revolution in Japan, and the most 
expedient way of doing that is to force through a reversal of social patterns 
by means of the constitution.”64  They used the Weimar Constitution as a 
model, which had provided Germans with social welfare rights65 intended to 
be concrete, positive rights.66  Drafters applied the philosophy encompassed 
within the Weimar Constitution, which professed the State’s duty to promote 
social welfare policies to social and civil rights provisions.67  In one week 
and in complete secrecy, the GS drafted the Showa Constitution,68 crediting 
                                           
60
  See MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 103-04. 
61
  See GORDON, supra note 58, at 120-24. 
62
  MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 97-98. 
63
  Id. at 98. 
64
  GORDON, supra note 58, at 116; Fritz Snyder, The Fundamental Human Rights, 14 INT’L LEGAL 
PERSP. 30, 31 (2005). 
65
  See WEIMAR CONSTITUTION, pt. 2, ch. 4 (granting the right to education); ch. 5, art. 157, 159, 165 
(granting the right to organize labor and promoting collective bargaining); ch. 5, art. 161 (granting 
universal insurance) (F.R.G.), available at http://www.zum.de/psm/weimar/weimar_vve.php.  Social rights 
in the Weimar Constitution required the State establish comprehensive insurance systems and granted every 
person the opportunity to work or economic support if no appropriate work was available. 
66
  The Social Democrats involved in forming the Japanese Constitution saw the Weimar Constitution 
as a model modern constitution because it used positive rights to adjust constitutional doctrine to modern 
conditions.  State power used social welfare measures to protect and further wanted modern constitutions to 
reflect this new state. According to Social Democrats, Germany’s democracy collapsed because the 
Weimar Constitution was not truly in force.  The social rights included within the Weimar Constitution 
were positive, concrete rights; however, while they may have been individually justiciable, in reality they 
could not be enforced without judicial review.  See Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional Guarantees of Social 
Welfare in the Process of German Unification, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 304 (1999); MOORE & ROBINSON, 
supra note 57, at 256. 
67
  GORDON, supra note 58, at 110 (documenting Beate Sirota Gordon’s philosophy for constitutional 
rights, one that was common among the Governmental Section). 
68
  Snyder, supra note 64, at 32.  It is important to acknowledge that neither the American occupation 
authorities nor the Japanese officials working with SCAP “talked past” or “duped” each other, 
misunderstanding the constitutional scheme envisioned by the other.  Ford, supra note 12, at 58. 
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the document to the Japanese government to give it greater legitimacy.69  
The original SCAP version of the Showa Constitution included a number of 
provisions from the Weimar Constitution that granted specific rights.70  
Thus, the drafters originally intended that Article 25 supply an enforceable, 
positive social right.71 
The framers did not all hold one view about how the judiciary would 
interpret the social rights provisions; however, a strong contingent believed 
the social rights provisions provided a forceful and progressive mandate on 
the government’s public role.72  Two camps within SCAP, the practicalists 
and the idealists, disagreed on social policy, and eventually General 
Whitney73 had to make an executive decision “to leave out detailed policies 
and to include instead a general statement providing for social welfare 
protection.”74  The drafters wanted the social rights provisions to contain 
strong, enforceable language, but the steering committee tempered the 
language for political reasons, hoping this would instigate the Japanese 
government to agree faster and with less resistance.75  Although the steering 
committee struck down prospects for strong, positive rights enforcement, the 
forceful spirit remained in the negative right of Article 25, albeit dormant 
due to the judiciary’s failure to recognize the negative right.  As it is written, 
Article 25 consists of a positive right (the Promotions Clause directs the 
government to enact policies that promote the public’s ability to maintain a 
minimum standard of living)76 and a negative right (the Minimum Standards 
Clause prohibits the government from preventing one from maintaining a 
minimum standard of living).77 
                                           
69
  Id. at 32. 
70
  See GORDON, supra note 58, at 107 (stating Gordon's special interest in the Weimar Constitution 
as a model when drafting social rights provisions of the Showa Constitution); Snyder, supra note 64, at 32 
(listing many of the specific provisions Gordon included). 
71
  See, e.g.,Yasuhiro Okudaira, Forty Years of the Constitution and Its Various Influences: Japanese, 
American, and European, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17, 24 (1990) (stating that Japan’s Constitution “is 
more extensive than that of the American Constitution” because it “enumerates socioeconomic rights 
because of the influence of the Weimar Constitution and the experience of the American New Dealers”). 
72
  See Snyder, supra note 64, at 31. 
73
  General Whitney was a chief aid to General MacArthur.  MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 
6. 
74
  GORDON, supra note 58, at 116. 
75
  Id. at 120 (stating that MacArthur was in a hurry to draft the Constitution before the Allied 
powers, who opposed MacArthur’s imperial system, established the Far Eastern Commission, and Japan 
had an election scheduled for April 10).  
76
  The Livelihood Protection Act is an example of a law passed to promote the public’s ability to 
maintain a minimum standard of living. See Osuka, supra note 5, at 16 (stating that the present Livelihood 
Protection Act of 1950 provided a legal means to confirm the right to a decent life). 
77
  The Minimum Standards Clause can be defined as both a negative and a positive right.  See supra 
Part II. 
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B. Contrary to Its Textual Meaning and Original Intent, the Judiciary 
Has Interpreted Article 25 as Merely a Programmatic Declaration 
Contrary to the drafters’ intentions and the provision’s textual 
meaning, early judicial holdings refused to recognize Article 25 as a 
concrete or a negative right.78  The first judiciary under the new democratic 
Showa Constitution consisted of government officials from the prior 
regime.79  They held ultra-conservative beliefs about the government’s role 
to promote the general welfare,80 applying this ideology in Article 25 case 
decisions.   
Individuals have repeatedly come to the judiciary seeking relief, 
claiming the State violated their Article 25 right.  In each instance, the Court 
rejected the plaintiff’s claim for relief.  Three cases illustrate how the 
Supreme Court repeatedly interprets Article 25 as a programmatic 
declaration.  The Court first interpreted Article 25 in the Staples Food Act 
Case, gave a historic ruling in Asahi, and provided a recent opinion in the 
Health Insurance Case.  Additionally, one more case demonstrates how this 
social rights81 interpretation conflicts with international human rights treaty 
obligations.82   
In 1948, the Supreme Court first interpreted Article 25 as a mere 
programmatic declaration in the Staples Food Act Case.  In this case, the 
defendant violated the Staple Food Management Law by purchasing and 
transporting a small amount of rice.83  The Staple Food Management Law 
regulated price, supply, and demand as well as rationed foodstuffs to 
guarantee the population had staple foods and a stable economy.84  The 
defendant claimed the Staple Food Management Law, and its application, 
violated his Article 25 right because he could not maintain a minimum 
standard of living on the rations.85  He pled, “It is impossible to preserve life 
or maintain health on the current food ration.”86 
                                           
78
  See Staple Food Act Case, supra note 38, at 255. 
79
  Hamano, supra note 54, at 443. 
80
  Id. 
81
  Constitutional scholars distinguish social rights and political rights, which correspond to the 
positive and negative rights distinctions.  Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Right to a Dignified Life (Vida Digna): 
The Integration of Economic and Social Rights with Civil and Political Rights in the Inter-American 
Human Rights System, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 9 (2008). 
82
  See generally Staple Food Act Case, supra note 38, at 253-56; Asahi, supra note 37; Health 
Insurance Case, supra note 39. 
83
  Staple Food Act Case, supra note 38, at 253, 255. 
84
  Id. at 253. 
85
  Id. at 255. 
86
  Id. at 254. 
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Second, the Court affirmed the programmatic declaration 
interpretation of Article 25 in Asahi v. Japan without addressing whether 
Article 25 granted a negative right.87  Shigeru Asahi, a tuberculosis patient at 
the Okayama National Sanitarium, received 600 yen (U.S. $1.75)88 a month 
in government assistance,89 the highest amount the minister of welfare 
allowed.90  However, this could not support him.  When his brother began 
sending him 1,500 yen (U.S. $4.38) each month,91 the minister of the social 
welfare office ceased the welfare payments.92  Moreover, the minister 
ordered Asahi to pay the government an additional 900 yen each month from 
what his brother sent to cover part of Asahi’s expenses.93  Asahi claimed the 
minister’s application of the Livelihood Protection Act violated his Article 
25 rights.94 
The Supreme Court ruled against Asahi and held that Article 25 
“merely proclaims that it is a duty of the State to administer national policy 
in such a manner as to enable all the people to enjoy at least the minimum 
standards of wholesome and cultured living, and it does not grant the people 
as individuals any concrete rights.”95  Reiterating much of what it held in the 
Staple Food Act Case,96 the Court reaffirmed the minister’s discretion to 
apply the law.97 
Recently, the Supreme Court maintained its programmatic declaration 
interpretation of Article 25, ignoring any negative-rights analysis, in the 
2006 Health Insurance Case.98  Here, the appellant sued the City of 
Asahikawa because the mayor required full health insurance premiums 
despite the plaintiff’s claim that he could not afford them.99  The National 
Health Insurance Act mandated universal coverage100 and delegated 
regulation to the local municipalities.101  Under the national health insurance 
                                           
87
  Asahi, supra note 37, at 130. 
88
  Id.  These are 1978 dollars.  Today, 600 yen translates into U.S. $5.53. 
89
  Id. at 133. 
90
  Id. 
91
  Id. at 133. Today 1500 yen translates into U.S. $13.84. 
92
  Id. 
93
  Id. 
94
  See id. at 133-34. 
95
  Id. at 134 (quoting 2 KEISHŪ 1235 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 29, 1948) [Staple Food Act Case]). Asahi also 
received free meals, medical treatment, and accommodations at the hospital. 
96
  Id. at 134. 
97
  Interestingly, Asahi spurred an immense amount of scholarship within Japan, advocating that the 
Court interpret Article 25 as a concrete, positive right.  Osuka, supra note 5, at 17. 
98
  See generally Health Insurance Case, supra note 39. 
99
  Id. at Reasons I(1), III. 
100
  Kokumin Kenkō Hōkenhō [National Health Insurance Law], Law No. 192 of 1958, art. 5, 
translated in 8 EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 8430 (1983). 
101
  Id. art. 3. 
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system, heads of households paid a premium or tax to finance the 
program.102  However, the local ordinance that enforced the system in 
Asahikawa did not account for those in a constant state of poverty;103 it only 
allowed payment exemptions and reductions if lives became excessively 
difficult due to unforeseen disasters or incomes fell significantly in that 
particular year.104 
The Court found the ordinance’s restriction of premium reductions to 
only those in temporary financial hardship not excessively unreasonable or 
unreasonably discriminatory against the economically weak.105  According 
to the Court, the Social Security Act justified the mayor’s method of 
collecting premiums because it covered those permanently poor.106  The 
Court therefore held the National Health Insurance Act and the ordinance did 
not guarantee reduced payments for the permanently impoverished.107  Thus, 
the Court found the mayor complied with Article 25 despite the fact that he 
forced the appellant to pay insurance premiums he could not afford.108  The 
Court affirmed the mayor’s discretion to enforce the ordinance for the 
Health Insurance Act, found the Social Security Act covered the poor, and 
the Court therefore quickly dismissed the Article 25 claim.109 
The emergence of international law and deliberate treaty ratifications 
strengthened Japan’s established human rights protections by law despite the 
Supreme Court’s continued weak application of constitutional rights.  Article 
98(2) of the Showa Constitution gives international treaties the force of law 
within the country.110  Strong judicial enforcement of treaty rights often 
conflicts with the Court’s weak enforcement of constitutional rights, leaving 
the lower courts uncertain as to the extent they should protect human rights, 
as the Fingerprint Case illustrates.111  Here, a Korean political leader 
applying for a replacement registration card refused to allow police officers 
                                           
102
  Id. arts. 42(1), 43, 44. 
103
  Health Insurance Case, supra note 39, at Reasons I(1). 
104
  Id. at Reasons III. 
105
  Id. 
106
  Id. 
107
  Id. 
108
  Id. 
109
  Id. 
110
  KENPŌ, art. 98(2) (“Treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully 
observed.”). 
111
  Hamano, supra note 54, at 476-77 (discussing 1513 HANREI JIHŌ 71 (Osaka High Ct., Oct. 28, 
1994) [hereinafter Fingerprint Case]; Arrest Over Fingerprinting Refusal Not Illegal Supreme Court Rules, 
JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 8, 1998).  In this case, the international treaties conferred the same rights as the 
Constitution, preventing the judiciary from providing a consistent ruling while simultaneously strictly 
enforcing the treaty obligations but not enforcing the constitutional claims. 
JUNE 2008 JAPAN’S ARTICLE 25 AS A NEGATIVE RIGHT 749 
  
to fingerprint him, as the Alien Registration Law required.112  After being 
arrested for declining “repeated requests to appear for ‘voluntary’ police 
questioning,”113 officers strip-searched, forcibly fingerprinted and 
interrogated him, holding the man for the day.114  The man sued, claiming 
the legal requirement of fingerprinting violated Articles 13 (right to life, 
liberty, and pursuit of happiness)115 and 14 (equal protection)116 of the 
Showa Constitution and Articles 7 (degrading treatment)117 and 26 
(prohibition against discrimination/equal protection)118 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.119  The high court ruled for the 
plaintiff on all four counts, but the Supreme Court overturned the decision 
without recognizing the international treaty claims.120 
C. Japan Corrects Interpretations of Its Constitution Through 
Constitutional Transformation Rather than Amendment 
The Supreme Court can fix its misinterpretation of Article 25 through 
so-called constitutional transformation.  The Showa Constitution has never 
been formally amended;121 instead, Japan keeps its supreme legal document 
relevant through constitutional transformation.122  Constitutional 
transformation “is deemed to mean ‘a change in the meaning of particular 
constitutional provision(s) brought about through “reinterpretation” of the 
provision rather than through formal constitutional amendment.’”123  
Shifting the judiciary’s interpretation of Article 25 is therefore reasonable, 
practical, and appropriate given the country’s reticence to amend the 
constitution.124  
Interest in constitutional amendment made a brief surge in the early 
1950s and culminated in 1957, when the government appointed an official 
Commission on the Constitution to study the issue.125  However, the 
                                           
112
  Id. at 476. 
113
  Id. 
114
  Id. 
115
  KENPŌ, art. 13. 
116
  Id. art. 14. 
117
  United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171, art. 7 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
118
  Id. art. 26. 
119
  Hamano, supra note 54, at 476 (discussing the Fingerprint Case). 
120
  Id. at 477, 480. 
121
  Snyder, supra note 64, at 48. 
122
  Ford, supra note 12, at 58. 
123
  Id. (quoting Tomosuke Kasuya, Constitutional Transformation and the Ninth Article of the 
Japanese Constitution, 18 LAW IN JAPAN 1 (Paul S. Taylor trans., 1986)). 
124
  Id. at 56. 
125
  Id. 
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Commission’s 1964 report failed to put forth any recommendations and laid 
to rest any prospect for future amendments.126  
Absent the possibility of constitutional amendment, judges and legal 
scholars rely on constitutional transformation to keep the Showa 
Constitution effective and to eliminate disjunction between constitutional 
norms and social reality.127  Constitutional transformation is more than a 
theoretical proposition; the Supreme Court has adopted the idea “to fashion a 
new garment out of the constitutional fabric supplied by the Americans in 
1947.”128  Therefore, even though the Court has disregarded the true intent 
of Article 25, it can correct its wrongs in the same manner it adjusts other 
outdated constitutional interpretations simply by employing constitutional 
transformation. 
D. When the Court Addresses Article 25 Claims, It Fails to Engage in 
Any Negative-Rights Analyses 
When promulgating judicial decisions, the Court fails to examine 
Article 25 from a negative-rights perspective, the view that provides easier 
enforcement.  Therefore, while the Court has repeatedly ruled against 
plaintiffs in Article 25 suits, it has yet to issue an opinion declaring that 
Article 25 is not a negative right and is unenforceable as such.  Untrodden 
ground exists for the Court to rule Article 25 contains a concrete, negative 
right.  The three aforementioned cases demonstrate the Court’s silence on 
the negative-positive rights distinction. 
In the Staple Food Act Case, rather than examining whether the State 
actually prevented the defendant from maintaining a minimum standard of 
living, the Court only focused on Article 25 as conferring a positive, 
programmatic declaration and justifying the Staple Food Act’s application.129  
In addition to holding that the Promotions Clause130 merely declared the 
government take positive action to strengthen social services,131 the Court 
further held that the Minimum Standards Clause132 was also a declaration to 
                                           
126
  Id. 
127
  Id. at 58-59. 
128
  Id. at 59.  Perhaps the most common example is Article 9 of the Showa Constitution, the provision 
renouncing war and prohibiting a military force.  See Canon Pence, Reform in the Rising Sun: Koizumi’s 
Bid to Revise Japan’s Pacifist Constitution, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 335, 373-74 (2006); Kenneth 
L. Port, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and the Rule of Law, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 127, 
150-51 (2005). 
129
  Staple Food Act Case, supra note 38, at 255. 
130
  KENPŌ, art. 25(2). 
131
  See Staple Food Act Case, supra note 38, at 254-55. 
132
  KENPŌ, art. 25(1). 
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enact and enforce social legislation.133  According to the Court, “the state 
does not bear such an obligation [to strengthen and extend social services] 
concretely and materially toward the people as individuals.”134  The Court 
only considered the positive rights aspect and ruled the Showa Constitution 
obligates the State to provide social services, but individuals cannot demand 
they receive these social services.135  Thus, the Court transformed Article 25 
from a right to a declaration, deviating from its original intended force.  
However, the Court’s opinion shows it only considered Article 25 under a 
positive rights lens.   
The Court’s use of the word “any” in the Asahi opinion could 
incorporate negative and positive rights, but the emphasis on “duty of the 
state” and administering policy so as to “enable” indicates an emphasis on 
positive rights rather than preventing state interference.136  The Court 
declared that only the laws enacted under Article 25 provide concrete 
rights.137  Article 25 did not protect individuals against government actions 
violating the provision.  Once again, the Court’s language focused on the 
possibility that Article 25 might require the government to provide 
something;138 the Court then found Article 25 as a nonjusticiable, positive 
right, without using the negative-positive rights distinction.139   
In the Health Insurance Case, the Court briefly addressed the 
appellant’s Article 25 claim.  Upon doing so, the Court quickly dismissed 
it,140 effectively ignoring any negative-rights analysis.  The government 
applied the Social Security Act and the Health Insurance Act, preventing the 
plaintiff from being covered by either.  Therefore, the government’s 
application of the laws left the plaintiff unable to afford health insurance or 
comply with the law mandating coverage.  However, the Court only saw the 
appellant’s claim about the State’s failure to provide health insurance,141 not 
the barriers it created to obtain health care and follow the law. 
                                           
133
  See Staple Food Act Case, supra note 38, at 255. 
134
  Id. 
135
  Id. 
136
  Asahi, supra note 37, at 134-35. 
137
  Id. at 134 (“A concrete right is secured only through the provisions of the Livelihood Protection 
Law enacted to realize the objectives prescribed in the provisions of the Constitution.”). 
138
  See id. 
139
  Id. 
140
  Health Insurance Case, supra note 39, at Reasons III. 
141
  See generally id. 
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IV. MISINTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 25 AS MERELY A PROGRAMMATIC 
DECLARATION CONFLICTS WITH JAPAN’S TREATY OBLIGATIONS  
Japan’s lower courts have struggled to follow the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional holdings because these holdings conflict with treaty provisions 
guaranteeing rights similar to those granted in the Showa Constitution.  
Starting in the 1970s, the legislature began ratifying a number of 
international treaties containing rights that reinforced those enumerated in 
the Showa Constitution, including Article 25.142  For example, within the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), Article 3 
grants the right to equal protection143 and Article 7 guarantees the right 
against inhuman and degrading punishment.144  The United Nations 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”) provides the right to organize labor in Articles 7 and 9145 and 
guarantees the right to an adequate standard of living in Article 11.146  The 
Showa Constitution provides these same rights.147 
A. Japan Has Ratified International Human Rights Treaties That 
Reinforce Constitutional Rights, Including That of Article 25 
Japan joined the international community to ratify human rights 
treaties, which enumerated rights already existing within the Showa 
Constitution.  Article 98(2) of the Showa Constitution gives treaties the force 
of law148 equal to legislatively-created law.  When ratified without 
reservations,149 the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary must follow 
and adhere to the treaties as they abide by constitutional and statutory 
provisions.150  These treaties specifically reinforced the right to social 
                                           
142
  See United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status by Country, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/TBS/doc.nsf/newhvstatusbycountry?OpenView (expand “Japan” hyperlink) (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2008) (showing when Japan ratified various international human rights treaties). 
143
  ICCPR, supra note 117, art. 3. 
144
  Id. art. 7. 
145
  United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3, arts. 7, 9 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
146
  Id. art. 11. 
147
  KENPŌ, arts. 14, 25 (granting the right to equal protection, a minimum standard of living, to 
organize labor, and against cruel punishment). 
148
  Id. art. 98(2) (“treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully 
observed”). 
149
  Hamano, supra note 54, at 468. 
150
  Id. 
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standards.151  The two most prominent are the ICCPR, ratified in 1979,152 
and the ICESCR, ratified in 1979.153 
The ICCPR and ICESCR contain provisions that mirror the 
Constitution’s social rights provisions.  Article 11(1) of ICESCR requires 
states to “recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living 
for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, 
and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.  The States Parties 
will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right.”154  This 
language resembles Article 25’s “right to maintain the minimum standards of 
wholesome and cultured living” and its requirement that the State “use its 
endeavors” to promote “social welfare and security.”155 
The absence of any noteworthy reservations indicates that the 
Japanese government wanted full enforcement of the treaties as written.156  
The government had the option to accept the treaties conditionally by 
making reservations, understandings, and declarations (“RUDs”).  RUDs 
allow a country to become party to an international treaty in a qualified 
manner by exempting itself from certain obligations mandated upon member 
states.157  It is significant that before ratifying the treaties, the Japanese 
Government engaged in careful reviews of the legal system to ensure 
compliance158 and accepted the treaties without modification.  
                                           
151
  Additional treaty examples include Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted July 
28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.  Japan signed these treaties in 1982 and 1985.  
See United Nations Treaty Collection: Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty2ref.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2008); Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Japan, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/ 
Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet (expand “Japan” hyperlink; then follow “CEDAW-Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 22, 2008). 
152
  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Japan, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/ 
doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet (expand “Japan” hyperlink; then follow “CCPR-International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 22, 2008). 
153
  International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Japan, http://www.unhchr.ch/ 
tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet (expand “Japan” hyperlink; then follow “CESCR-International 
Convenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 22, 2008). 
154
  ICESCR, supra note 145, art. 11 (emphasis added). 
155
  KENPŌ, art. 25. 
156
  See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Japan, supra note 152 (lacking any 
documents on reservations and only noting one procedural reservation); International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Japan, supra note 153 (lacking any documents on reservations and 
only noting a few procedural reservations on such things as specialized secondary and higher education, 
social security, leisure, and labor unions). 
157
  Eric Neumayer, Qualified Ratification: Explaining Reservations to International Human Rights 
Treaties, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 397 (2007). 
158
  Hamano, supra note 54, at 468. 
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B. The Court Defers to the Other Branches When Interpreting 
Constitutional Rights, Which Conflicts with Treaty Obligations 
Even though the treaties and the Showa Constitution have the same 
force of law, the Court enforces them differently.  Rather than enforce the 
constitutional rights of Article 25, or the other social rights provisions, the 
Supreme Court defers to the other branches of government to enforce these 
rights.  However, the Court does not extend that same deference when 
interpreting and enforcing rights under international treaties ratified by the 
government.159  Judicial opinions illustrate this conflict and further 
illuminate the growing division between the lower courts and the Supreme 
Court.  A negative-rights interpretation of constitutional rights (including 
Article 25) that provides greater enforcement and stronger protection would 
harmonize interpretations of international treaty rights with constitutional 
rights by giving them the same force.   
Rights under international treaties have strong legal force, but when 
considering those same rights under the Showa Constitution, the Court 
defers to the other branches of government rather than providing strong 
enforcement.  Plaintiffs regularly bring actions160 claiming the violation of a 
right under both the Constitution and the ICCPR.  Both are legally binding 
within Japan’s domestic legal system.161  When confronted with these 
mirroring claims, the Supreme Court either ignores the treaty right or 
renders a very narrow interpretation of it.162  This unfortunate outcome runs 
counter to those principles embedded within Japan’s legal tradition and 
culture for “balance” and “harmony” between competing claims of right.163   
The Supreme Court’s rulings leave to lower courts the task of 
reconciling opposing interpretations of similar rights.  To resolve this 
conflict, some lower courts started applying constitutional rights more 
vigorously to conform to treaty rights.  This approach, however, has created 
a rift between lower court and Supreme Court decisions.  The treaty 
ratifications “rejuvenated litigation over the breadth of human rights 
protection in Japan,” and the courts found themselves drawn into questions 
of direct conflict.164  At first, the courts simply narrowed their interpretation 
                                           
159
  See id. at 469 (using strong language about judicial enforcement of treaty rights, particularly the 
ICCPR, which provide broad rights compared to constitutional rights narrowed by the courts). 
160
  See id. at 476-77. 
161
  KENPŌ, art. 98(2). 
162
  See supra Part III.B. 
163
  Ford, supra note 12, at 34, 48. 
164
  Hamano, supra note 54, at 469. 
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of the rights guaranteed within the treaties by denying valid claims.165  
However, around 1993 a shift occurred among the lower courts, and rulings 
began to recognize international human rights principles.166  To provide a 
consistent interpretation of treaty and constitutional rights, the lower courts 
ultimately began to enforce the constitutional rights more vigorously and did 
not passively defer to the executive as the judiciary system as a whole had 
done previously. 
The Fingerprint Case reveals the conflict between lower courts and 
the Supreme Court about the judiciary’s interpretations of human rights.167  
While the Fingerprint Case did not contain an Article 25 claim, it 
demonstrates the Court’s deference to the other branches of government in 
constitutional claims and the resulting conflict with similar international 
treaty claims.  The conflicting interpretations between the Supreme Court 
and the lower courts, as well as between the constitutional claims and 
international treaty claims, hinder Japan’s solid legal tradition of harmonious 
rulings and interpretations.  In the Fingerprint Case, the defendant sought a 
replacement alien registration card but refused to provide fingerprints or 
submit to “voluntary” questioning.168  He sued, claiming the fingerprint 
requirement violated Articles 13 and 14 of the Constitution169 (right to life 
liberty, and pursuit of happiness; equal protection)170 as well as Articles 7 
and 26 of the ICCPR171 (degrading treatment; equal protection).172  While 
the plaintiff did not raise an Article 25 claim, the judicial rulings on 
constitutional rights apply to Article 25 decisions.173  The Osaka High 
Court’s ruling for the plaintiff found the ICCPR and the Constitution 
provided broad human rights protection.174  The Osaka High Court held that 
                                           
165
  See id. at 469-70 (describing the various narrow views taken regarding treaty rights). 
166
  Id. at 473. 
167
  An earlier Supreme Court ruling, similar to the Fingerprint Case, demonstrates imbalance within 
the Supreme Court concerning treaty and constitutional rights treatment.  In the earlier case, five of ten 
judges dissented the Court’s overruling and stressed the importance of ICCPR rights.  Thus, a division also 
exists within the Court about the appropriate legal weight to give to the human rights treaties.  Id. at 477. 
168
  See Hamano, supra note 54, at 476 (discussing the Fingerprint Case); see also supra notes 111-
120 and accompanying text (providing details of the case). 
169
  Id. (discussing the Fingerprint Case); see also supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
170
  KENPŌ, arts. 13, 14. 
171
  See Hamano, supra note 54, at 476 (discussing the Fingerprint Case); see also supra note 119 and 
accompanying text. 
172
  ICCPR, supra note 117, arts. 7, 26. 
173
  Arguably, the right to a minimum standard of living is not as forceful as some of the rights 
asserted by the plaintiff in the Fingerprint Case.  Nonetheless, the case still provides an example applicable 
to Article 25 and the general conflict created by interpreting constitutional rights with deference and 
international treaty rights with strength. 
174
  Hamano, supra note 54, at 477 (discussing the Fingerprint Case); see also supra note 119 and 
accompanying text. 
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the ICCPR expanded individual rights because many specific ICCPR 
protections did not exist in Japanese domestic law.175  The Supreme Court 
overturned the high court’s ruling, but it made no reference to the ICCPR 
claim.176  The short opinion exhibited a common, but poorly applied, 
standard in constitutional case decisions to defer to the executive.  The 
absence of any mention of the ICCPR claim is especially significant in the 
Fingerprint Case given the apparent momentum in the lower courts to 
broaden the scope of individuals’ rights by recognizing the rights provided in 
the ICCPR.177   
The Court’s refusal to acknowledge the ICCPR claim in the 
Fingerprint Case demonstrates the Court’s reticence to reconcile the two 
supreme legal documents, showing the incompatibility between recognizing 
international treaty rights and applying the Supreme Court’s lackluster 
protection of constitutional rights.  Both the Constitution and the ICCPR 
have equal force under the Japanese legal system, should be interpreted 
consistently, and neither preempts the other.178  
V. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD INTERPRET ARTICLE 25 AS A CONCRETE, 
NEGATIVE RIGHT TO PROVIDE STRONGER PROTECTION  
Part V analyzes the policy behind interpreting Article 25(1) as a 
concrete, negative right.  This includes examining the positive consequences 
resulting from such an interpretation, the practical methods to provide such 
an interpretation, and the internal and external pressures pushing for such an 
interpretation.  
A. Interpreting Article 25 as a Concrete, Negative Right Will Produce 
Positive Results for Japan’s Legal System 
Interpreting Article 25 as a concrete, negative right will benefit 
Japan’s legal system by giving Article 25 greater force and improving 
Japan’s system of checks and balances. 
                                           
175
  Id. 
176
  Id. 
177
  Id. at 480. 
178
  Id. at 469 (quoting Japan’s Third Periodic Report to the Human Rights Committee that implies the 
government claims to view the ICCPR on the same level as the Constitution and asserts that both are to be 
interpreted with similar authority). 
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1. Article 25’s Concrete, Negative Right Will Improve Japan’s System of 
Checks and Balances, Strengthening Its Legal System 
Interpreting Article 25 as a concrete, negative right allows judicial 
redress when the State violates an individual’s right to maintain a minimum 
standard of living.179  Serious adherence to that responsibility requires 
judicial oversight upon the executive and legislature, strengthening the 
system of checks and balances and promoting a healthier, better functioning 
legal system. 
A healthy legal system usually requires judicial oversight of the 
executive and legislature.  While the Diet holds a supreme position relative 
to the judiciary and executive,180 the Showa Constitution explicitly affirms 
the Court’s power of judicial review.181  The constitutional framers 
intentionally included Article 81 because many viewed the collapse of 
German democracy under the Weimar Constitution as a result of the absence 
of judicial review and a powerful judiciary capable of effective oversight.182 
While the Supreme Court has demonstrated a preference for deferring 
to the other governmental branches,183 it has been more willing to oversee 
the executive and the Diet when faced with violations of concrete, negative 
rights, especially when such violations hinder the public welfare.184  When 
the Court finds a law or government action unconstitutional, it declares that 
the State violated a negative right.185  Consistent with Japan’s cultural and 
legal attitudes, the Court only overturns a statute or government action after 
balancing the individual harm against the public welfare promoted by the 
restriction.186  The negative right to maintain a minimum standard of living 
does not directly oppose the general welfare, and enforcing it promotes the 
general welfare because everyone benefits from the reduction of poverty.  
Therefore, the Supreme Court will more likely enforce the right to a 
minimum standard of living if it recognizes Article 25 as a negative right. 
                                           
179
  See Ezer, supra note 2, at 7-8. 
180
  Ford, supra note 12, at 42. 
181
  KENPŌ, art. 81 (“The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with the power to determine the 
constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.”). 
182
  MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 257. 
183
  See Hamano, supra note 54, at 435; Ford, supra note 12, at 42. 
184
  See Ford, supra note 12, at 29-35 (providing examples of the Supreme Court's pattern of striking 
down legislation restricting negative rights provided the general welfare of the statute does not outweigh 
the individual harm, which include a 1960 freedom of expression case and a 1966 workers’ rights case). 
185
  See id. at 30 (discussing a case where the Court struck down a law that limited the freedom of 
expression); Toyama et al. v. Japan, 20 KEISHŪ 901 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 26, 1966), translated in HIROSHI ITOH 
& LAWRENCE WARD BEER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN 90-91 (1978) (ruling a law that 
restricted labor rights unconstitutional). 
186
  See Ford, supra note 12, at 26. 
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2. The Court Must Interpret Article 25 as a Concrete, Negative Right to 
Observe the Drafters’ Original Intent of It as a Forceful Right 
Those drafting the Showa Constitution intended Article 25 to be an 
enforceable right,187 and the judiciary can enforce a negative right more 
easily than a positive right.188  If Article 25 only provided a positive right, it 
would not be forceful, as seen with the application of merely programmatic 
declarations.189  Practically, the judiciary cannot allow individuals to sue 
when the State fails to eliminate poverty and provide everyone with a 
minimum standard of living.  Effective judicial relief would be impossible; 
courts cannot force the State to do what it is incapable of doing. 
Concrete, negative rights avoid these problems.  A state can 
reasonably refrain from doing harm whereas it cannot necessarily cure all 
ills.  The specific nature of the former, compared to the open-endedness of 
the latter, indicates the feasibility of the negative right.190  For example, the 
Court can easily order the State stop prosecuting an individual for violating 
the Staple Food Act because as applied, the Act forces the man to go hungry.  
The Court could also issue an opinion that warns the Diet that the Court 
finds that a certain law violates the Constitution, directing the Diet to change 
the law.191  The Court has trouble demanding the State eliminate poverty or 
construct housing for every homeless individual.  The Supreme Court, by 
recognizing Article 25’s concrete, negative right, would grant relief only on 
specific occasions when the State actively prevented someone from 
maintaining his or her minimum standard of living.   
3. Interpreting Article 25 as a Concrete, Negative Right Resolves the 
Conflict Between the Constitution and International Treaties 
The judiciary could take one of three approaches to resolve the 
existing conflict between the level of protection the judiciary applies to 
constitutional rights with that applied to international treaty rights.  First, the 
courts could rule each document provides a different level of protection.  
                                           
187
  See supra Part III.A. 
188
  See Wald, supra note 6, at 559 (positing the view that positive rights cannot be judicially 
enforceable); see also Wiles, supra note 4, at 50 (restating arguments about the difficulty in legally 
enforcing socio-economic rights). 
189
  See Asahi, supra note 37, at 134 (holding and quoting the Staple Food Act Case that Article 25 
“merely proclaims that it is a duty of the State to administer national policy in such a manner as to enable 
all the people to enjoy at least the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living, and it does not 
grant the people as individuals any concrete rights”). 
190
  Wiles, supra note 4, at 50 (restating arguments about the difficulty in legally enforcing socio-
economic rights). 
191
  See infra Part V.B.1. 
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However, this interpretation contravenes Japan’s legal culture and tradition 
of interpreting similar rights consistently to promote harmony and balance 
within the legal system.192  Second, the judiciary could weaken the force 
with which it protects international treaty rights.  Finally, the judiciary could 
interpret constitutional rights with greater force.   
Interpreting constitutional rights with greater force provides the best 
solution.  First, in addition to resolving the conflict of laws between the 
rights protected in the Showa Constitution and international treaties, stronger 
enforcement of constitutional rights alleviates the rift between the lower 
courts and the Supreme Court.  The lower courts’ previous attempts to apply 
this strategy193 demonstrate their preference for stronger constitutional 
enforcement as opposed to weakening treaty rights or simply yielding to 
interpret the documents with different force.  Second, stronger constitutional 
enforcement promotes Japan’s legal tradition of harmony among decisions 
and governmental branches.  Third, individuals will realize greater 
protection in their constitutional and treaty rights.  Fourth, this route 
supports the desires within the international community.194  Finally, 
international treaty provisions can provide the courts guidance when they 
interpret vague provisions within the Constitution. 
The concrete, negative-rights interpretation provides a relatively 
uncontroversial path for the judiciary to enforce constitutional rights with 
greater vigor, enabling the courts to oversee the other branches of 
government.195  The Supreme Court’s attitude towards Article 25 follows the 
Court’s general attitude towards constitutional social rights.  Interpreting 
Article 25 as a concrete, negative right will generate greater human rights 
protections under the Constitution, ameliorating the inconsistent rulings and 
providing a map towards resolving the larger issue. 
B. Interpreting Article 25 as a Concrete, Negative Right Is Practical 
The Supreme Court can realistically enforce Article 25 as a concrete, 
negative right.  First, the Court can maintain its preference for judicial 
harmony and balance by applying the “warnings approach”196 and 
                                           
192
  “The Charming Betsy” canon provides a U.S. law analogy, where the United States Supreme 
Court ruled that “an act of Congress ought never be construed to violate the law of nations if any other 
possible construction remains.”  Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804). 
193
  See Hamano, supra note 54, at 476 (discussing the Fingerprint Case); see also supra notes 111-
120 and accompanying text (providing details of the case). 
194
  See infra notes 230-236 and accompanying text. 
195
  See supra notes 17-22, 121-124 and accompanying text (discussing how courts realistically should 
not find it difficult to enforce provisions as concrete, negative rights).  
196
  See Ford, supra note 12, at 47. 
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“constitutional transformation” rather than overtly overruling legislation or 
formally amending the Showa Constitution in order to achieve the concrete, 
negative-rights analysis.197  Second, the South African Constitutional Court’s 
rulings provide a useful model for the Japanese judiciary, consistent with 
Japan’s legal culture, through statutes parallel in construction to Japan’s.  
The South African Constitutional Court gives a dual interpretation to 
constitutional social rights provisions as providing both positive and 
negative rights.   
1. The “Warning Approach” and “Constitutional Transformation” 
Enable Article 25 Enforcement Consistent with Japan’s Legal Values 
The judiciary can use the “warning approach” to minimize conflict 
that a concrete, negative-rights interpretation could produce with other 
branches of government.  A warning is a judicial notice of 
unconstitutionality, directing the Diet or executive to fix the problem by 
changing the law or action.198  While most unconstitutional behavior would 
result from the executive improperly applying a law, the judiciary, at times, 
may have to invalidate a whole act that violates Article 25.  In similar 
situations, when the judiciary issues a warning of unconstitutionality, the 
Diet usually responds quickly, changing the legal provision and avoiding 
conflict with the courts.199  The “warning approach” adheres to Japan’s legal 
culture, which seeks to achieve balance and harmony when faced with 
constitutional conflicts.200  Through this approach the Supreme Court neither 
wholly abdicates its responsibility for judicial review nor actually enforces 
its reading of the Showa Constitution.201  A successful claim ultimately ends 
with improved government action no longer hindering one’s ability to 
maintain a minimum standard of living without an opinion that explicitly 
overrules the action or policy. 
“Constitutional transformation” supports the Supreme Court 
recognizing Article 25 as a concrete, negative right.  The Court applies 
“constitutional transformation” to modernize the Constitution in place of 
constitutional amendment.  Social and economic conditions now exist to 
support Article 25 becoming a stronger, individually enforceable right, true 
to the framers’ original intent.202  Reinterpreting Article 25 to recognize its 
                                           
197
  Id. at 58. 
198
  Id. at 47. 
199
  Id. at 47, 49. 
200
  Id. at 48-49. 
201
  Id. at 47. 
202
  See infra Part V.C. 
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concrete, negative right provides the ideal mechanism that remains 
compatible with Japan’s legal culture and system. 
2. The South African Constitutional Court Provides a Model for the 
Supreme Court to Interpret Article 25 as a Negative Right 
The South African Constitutional Court has effectively adjudicated 
constitutional social rights from a negative-rights perspective while still 
maintaining respectable deference to the other branches of government.  
Two South African rulings provide a useful model for the Supreme Court in 
Article 25 rulings.   
The structure of South African constitutional rights parallels the 
structure of rights within the Showa Constitution.  For example, Section 26 
of the South African Constitution states, “(1) Everyone has the right to have 
access to adequate housing [negative right].  (2) The state must take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to 
achieve the progressive realisation of this right [positive right].”203  Section 
26 mirrors the language and structure of Article 25.  The first subsection 
guarantees the right and provides the concrete, negative right.  The second 
subsection provides the programmatic declaration, placing a duty upon the 
State to develop proposals in furtherance of the provision. 
The South African Constitutional Court’s ruling in Government of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom and Others204 provides a 
lens through which courts can recognize concrete, negative rights within 
social rights.  The plaintiff, Irene Grootboom, along with 510 children and 
390 adults sued when evicted from a squatter settlement and then 
inhumanely forced from an informal settlement.  Their possessions were 
burned and their homes destroyed.205  Plaintiffs claimed the Government 
violated Section 26 of the South African Constitution, granting the right to 
housing,206 and Section 28 of the South African Constitution, granting 
children the right to basic nutrition, shelter, health care services, and social 
services.207 
The Court began its opinion by identifying the State’s negative 
obligation, “to desist from preventing or impairing the right of access to 
                                           
203
  S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 26, available at http://www.concourt.gov.za/site/theconstitution/ 
english.pdf (alterations added).  Subsection 3 prohibits arbitrary eviction, but that is irrelevant for this case 
analysis. 
204
  Government of the Republic of South Africa & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR 
1169 (CC) (S.Afr.). 
205
  Id. 
206
  S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 § 26. 
207
  Id. § 28. 
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adequate housing.”208  The Court articulated the issue before it as whether 
the State acted reasonably,209 and ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, it gave 
some deference to the legislature.210  While the Court ordered the State to 
remedy the failing, it left implementation up to the legislature.211  
Recognizing the limitations of enforcing Section 26 as a concrete, positive 
right, the Court stated that the rights in question did not entitle “the 
respondents to claim shelter or housing immediately upon demand.”212  The 
Court, aware that enforcing Section 26 as a positive right proved impractical, 
applied the provision’s negative right, assuring it had meaning and 
muscle.213 
In Jaftha v Schoeman and Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others,214 
the Constitutional Court affirmed the existence of negative rights within 
social rights, modeling their judicial enforceability.215  The plaintiffs sued, 
alleging the State violated their constitutional right to housing after their 
residences were sold to recover debt owed to another private party.216  
Ruling on the negative rights provision, the Court unanimously held, “at the 
very least, any measure which permits a person to be deprived of existing 
access to adequate housing limits the rights protected in section 26(1),” and 
that the absence of judicial oversight for the forced sale procedure meant the 
action violated Section 26.217 
The Supreme Court of Japan should adopt the South African 
Constitutional Court’s analyses and rulings.  Doing so would provide a 
natural solution to alleviate harms that occur from an unconstitutional law or 
the executive branch unconstitutionally applying a statute causing harm to 
individuals such as in the Staple Food Act Case, Asahi, and the Health 
Insurance Case.   
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  Christiansen, supra note 3, at 366 (quoting Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169, ¶ 34). 
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  See Fitzpatrick & Slye, supra note 51, at 677. 
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  See Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169, ¶ 99. 
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  Fitzpatrick & Slye, supra note 51, at 673. 
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  See Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169, ¶¶ 38, 46, 71, 73, 88, 90 (recognizing the limitations of 
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negative constitutional right). 
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  Jaftha v Schoeman & Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz & Others 2003 (3) All SA 690 (CC) at 34 (S. 
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  See id.  Two cases were consolidated because they have similar facts and raise the same issue. 
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  Community Law Centre, Case Brief of the Jaftha opinion, 
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/Socio-Economic-Rights/case-reviews-1/south-african-cases/ 
(follow “High Court Cases” hyperlink; then follow “Jaftha v Shoeman and Others” hyperlink) (last visited 
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  Christiansen, supra note 3, at 372 (quoting Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: 
In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) ¶ 78 (S. Afr.)). 
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C. Internal and External Pressures Push the Supreme Court to Interpret 
Article 25 as a Concrete, Negative Right 
The legal community, the international human rights community, and 
current domestic economic conditions pressure Japan for judicial reform.  
The attitudes within these communities and the surrounding conditions have 
developed and aligned to make this the most opportune time for change. 
1. The Legal Community’s Dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court’s 
Current Constitutional Interpretations Indicates a Desire for Change 
The legal community’s dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court’s 
conservative constitutional rights interpretations has brewed for some time.  
Interpreting Article 25 as a concrete, negative right could lessen the accruing 
sentiments subtlety, avoiding an upsurge. 
The Young Lawyers Association (“YLA”) movement demonstrates 
the first clamor in the steady progression of rumblings within the legal 
community towards the drafters’ original intent behind constitutional rights.  
The YLA, founded in 1954, promoted constitutional ideals,218 including 
preserving the principle to judicially enforce individual constitutional rights 
and strictly implement the Showa Constitution’s original intent.219  The 
organization grew in numbers with a large proportion of new judges holding 
YLA memberships.220  By 1969, however, a full-scale purge occurred of 
YLA members from the bench, and the General Secretariat of the Supreme 
Court asked all judges to resign from the YLA.221 
That same resistance to the Supreme Court’s conservative rulings 
appears today with the increasing conflict between human rights treaties and 
constitutional rights.  As previously explained, the high courts have started 
to handle constitutional and ICCPR claims differently, providing more 
oversight and deferring less to the other branches of government.222  The 
Illegitimate Child Case223 provides one such example.  In 1993, the Tokyo 
High Court, indicating a break from the Supreme Court’s deference to the 
                                           
218
  Hamano, supra note 54, at 446.  Members of the Young Lawyer’s Association (“YLA”) included 
“judges, schooled in postwar democracy, came from different political backgrounds, including socialism, 
the left wing of the LDP, and communism.” 
219
  Id. 
220
  Id. (reporting that by 1963, the YLA encompassed 140 judges, and about one-third of new 
assistant judges who entered the judiciary each year were YLA members). 
221
  Id. at 447.  The Supreme Court stifled the 1968 movement after an article named and accused 
YLA member judges of being communists.  The Supreme Court distributed copies of the magazine to 
courts throughout the country. 
222
  See id. at 469. 
223
  See id. at 475 (discussing 1465 HANREI JIHŌ 55 (Tokyo High Ct., June 23, 1993)). 
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other governmental branches, ruled that a provision of the Civil Code 
violated the Constitution, the ICCPR, and the Children’s Rights Treaty.224  
The provision required an intestate share guaranteed by law to an 
illegitimate child be one-half of that guaranteed to a legitimate child.225  The 
court relied on the ICCPR and the Children’s Rights Treaty, to interpret the 
constitutional provision.226  The mid-1990s brought more high courts 
following suit,227 and pressure continues to mount from the lower courts to 
reconcile ICCPR rights with constitutional rights. 
At the same time, Japanese non-governmental organizations 
(“NGOs”) have grown critical of the Supreme Court’s stance.228  NGOs 
submitted over 120 counter reports to the Human Rights Committee, 
criticizing the Supreme Court’s human rights enforcement and ICCPR 
implementation.229  Organizations like the Japan Federation of Bar 
Associations and Japanese Civil Liberties Union have expressed similar 
concerns.230 
Concern also exists within the international community regarding the 
Supreme Court’s human rights enforcement.  In the 1990s, the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee expressed skepticism about Japan’s 
claims that courts effectively enforced the ICCPR.231  Organizations that 
have issued disparaging reviews include Amnesty International,232 Human 
Rights Watch,233 World Organisation Against Torture,234 Asia-Japan 
Women’s Resource Center,235 and Madre236 among others. 
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2. Economic Conditions and Public Welfare Support a Forceful 
Interpretation of Article 25 as a Concrete, Negative Right 
Recent poverty trends combined with the potential of Article 25 to 
alleviate poverty make a convincing case for the judiciary to enforce Article 
25 as a concrete, negative right.  Japan’s poverty levels are increasing at 
alarming rates.  A country once known for maintaining a strong middle-class 
in the face of rapid economic growth now sees more and more individuals 
falling into the lower-income brackets.237  Between the mid-1980s and 2000, 
the proportion of the population living in absolute poverty increased by five 
percentage points.238  Moreover, Japan is the only OECD country to record 
such an increase within this time period.239  The economic conditions give a 
sense of urgency and make it even more necessary that every branch of the 
Japanese government use its full power to ensure all individuals can 
maintain that minimum standard of living guaranteed within Article 25.  
Article 25 has enormous potential to alleviate these growing economic 
problems.  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court currently prohibits the 
provision from granting any individual redress.  As seen in the Staple Food 
Act Case, Asahi, and the Health Insurance Case, had the Court interpreted 
Article 25 as a concrete, negative right, while applying the reasonableness 
standard, the individuals may have escaped the state actions that prevented 
them from their pursuit of a minimum standard of living.  The Court would 
allow Asahi to keep his money, the defendant of the Food Staple Act Case to 
acquire more food (or at least avoid prosecution), and the Health Insurance 
Case appellant to refrain from paying an insurance premium he could not 
afford. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As long as poverty continues to exist, governments have the 
responsibility to work towards its eradication.  They must act forcefully and 
follow through on commitments made to alleviate poverty and ensure 
everyone can maintain a minimum standard of living.  The three branches of 
government must work together and challenge each other to fulfill this 
obligation.  Japan made a commitment to its people in Article 25 in this 
effort to eliminate poverty.  The Article has substantial potential, but in 
practice, the judiciary refuses to allow the provision to achieve this potential.  
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Recognition of the concrete, negative right within Article 25 and an 
unwavering commitment to enforce it provides an interpretation consistent 
with what the drafters originally intended.  Such an interpretation of Article 
25 harmonizes the Showa Constitution with international treaties and could 
provide significant progress for the Japanese people in the crusade to 
achieve a country in which everyone truly can maintain that minimum 
standard of wholesome and cultured living. 
